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The evidence for rationalization, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated.
Experimental evidence shows that rationalization efects are smal, rather than gross
and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon.
At least some examples taken to show rationalization also have an interpretation
compatible with deliberate, knowing, reason-responsiveness on the part of
participants.
The evidence for rationalization, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated.
There are two sources for this. First, it is an outcome of structural features of the
experimental psychology tradition, which isolates efects using experimental control,
and then uses nul-hypothesis signicance testing to establish their reality (i.e. their
non-zero size) at the neglect of gauging their importance (Staford, 2014). The second
source of this exaggeration is the rhetoric of psychologists, who make hay out of
emphasising the supposedly irrational aspects of our behaviour, de-emphasising
reason-responsiveness (Staford, 2015).
With respect to the target article, we can see this in the motivating section (1.1,
“rationalization’, p7 f). Rationalization is presented as pervasive (“people rationalize
al the time”), solidly evidenced (“exhaustively documented”) and leading to “gross
errors” which are “stubbornly irrational”. 
A study recruited as a key ilustration of rationalization is Sharot et al (2010), but
when we look at this example, we see that the largest efect reported in this paper was
an average within-subject change of ~0.07 on a 6 point scale (experiment 1, see Figure
1, t(20)=2.4,p<0.03), so the rationalization manipulation produced a mean shift of
~1% in people’s judgements. Hardly gross or stubborn.
Other examples cited by the target article are similar - showing smal movements in
people’s ratings of belief, rather than lips from one belief state to another. This
contrasts with the rhetorical portrayal of rationalisation. Participants in Brehm’s
(1956) study showed an average change of ~0.9 on an 8 point scale (ie an ~11%
between-groups shift, p<0.01, with n=~30 in each group). The experiment design,
analysis and presentation of results presented by Vinckier et al (2019) does not make a
simple estimation of efect size for rationalization obvious, but reading Figure 3 it
looks like the within subject efect size of choice (i.e of rationalisation) is ~0.15 of a
standardised (z) score. A “smal efect”, as classicaly determined (Cohen, 1992).
Some might view this as unproblematic. A reasonable view is that rationalization is
indeed common and commonly produces “gross errors”, but the methods of
experimental psychology mean we can only hope to consistently capture
rationalisation in the proxy-form of meagre shifts on rating scales. But it is also a
reasonable view, I believe, that the extant evidence for rationalization does not support
the grand claims for the power of the phenomenon. It is not enough that an idea be
intuitively plausible.
The target article also invokes classic and widely known studies in psychology as
evidence of rationalisation. Given space it is not possible to review al of them, but it
is instructive to pick a couple of salient examples. Cognitive dissonance is the irst
citation of the target article (Festinger, 1962). The foundational demonstration of
cognitive dissonance is Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). Taking the largest efect
reported in this study, participants’ ratings of “enjoyability of task”, this showed a
mean shift of 1.40 on an 11 point scale (i.e. ~13% change, between groups, p<0.03,
t(38)=2.22, with n=20 in each group). 
Another foundational contribution is Nisbet and Wilson (1977), for which (surely) the
most discussed study is Wilson and Nisbet (1978, experiment 2), in which shoppers
were asked to choose between four identical pairs of stockings. Famously, shoppers
preferred the stockings on the right (p<0.025, n=52), but gave reasons other than
position for their preference. Here my issue is not the size of the efect, but of its
interpretation. While the explanations ofered could be due to rationalization, failure to
report reasons is not the same as their inaccessibility. Staford (2014) argues that,
where participants are ignorant of the conditions by which experimenters analyse their
behaviour, failure to report those conditions is wholy compatible with rational choice.
Note my argument is not about the reproducibility, or not, of the evidence base, but
rather of its interpretation. 
It is teling that other motivating examples evokes by Cushman are ictional and/or
psychologicaly exceptional (amnesia in the Bourne Identity, split-brain patients).
While these are highly suggestive of the human potential of rationalization they cannot
be taken as evidence that rationalization is pervasive in ordinary cognition. 
I have argued that errors due to rationalization are often smal, rather than gross. The
interpretive slippage between experimental efects at single time points, and unusual
edge cases (like split brain patients) means that the evidence for the persistence
(‘stubbornness’) of rationalization is simply unclear.  Further, while the target article
notes that reasons are a factor in driving action, alongside rationalization, it is possible
that some evidence presented as demonstrating rationalization could actualy be
showing rational behaviour (so, for example, in Wilson and Nisbet, 1978, it could be
viewed as rational to give and defend an implausible answer if a psychologist asks you
an impossible question such as which pair of identical stockings you prefer).
Where, then, does this leave the Cushman “representational exchange” account? I am
not claiming that rationalization doesn’t exist, only that the evidence psychology has
produced in support of it is far less strong than is commonly supposed. There is stil -
potentialy - something for Cushman’s account to explain. My criticism highlights an
opportunity: one test of the value of Cushman’s account is if it can provide
experimentalists with the leverage to produce beter evidence of rationalization; that is,
the value of the account could be in alowing us to predict when and how
rationalization wil be at its strongest and most divergent from simple rationality in
which actions are motivated by consciously-accessible reasons.
Perhaps, guided by beter theory, experimentalists wil be able to generate
manipulations which show rationalisation in the lab consonant with our intuitions of
its importance in our everyday lives.
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